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INTRODUCTION
An important and urgent way of widen-
ing the scope of embodied and situated
approaches to intersubjectivity consists in
exploring their implications for ethics1.
Cash (2010, 2013) has recently argued
for a rethinking of seminal ethical con-
cepts against the background of the idea of
socially distributed cognition. Colombetti
and Torrance (2009) have proposed an
ethics based on an enactive cognitive sci-
ence of social life 2. In this short paper, I
want to focus mainly on the latter proposal
and argue that recent developments in the
enactive approach to social phenomena
call for further expansion of an enactive
ethics beyond its initial focus on face-to-
face dyadic interactions. In this respect I
aim to draw attention to the so far under-
appreciated kinship between an enactive
ethics and the ethics of care. I consider
the alliance of these two as remarkably
well suited for abandoning the pitfalls of
a widespread view of human autonomy in
terms of the self-determination of individ-
ual rational agents, a view that has been
systematically questioned from the per-
spective of care ethics over the last 35 years,
but which still exerts a strong influence
on our thinking about the good life and
morality3.
1 In this paper, the term ethics stands for moral theory,
especially moral philosophy.
2In what follows, I will focus exclusively on the enac-
tivist tradition whose philosophical foundations have
been laid by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in The
Embodied Mind (Varela et al., 1991) and which has
been further exemplified by Thompson (2005, 2007),
Di Paolo (2005, 2009), De Jaegher and Di Paolo
(2007), Di Paolo et al. (2010), and Froese and Di Paolo
(2011).
ENACTIVE ETHICS AND SOCIALLY
EXTENDED MIND
Colombetti and Torrance (2009) made the
first attempt—and the only one that has
been made thus far—to show that the
enactivist shift of attention from the indi-
vidual to the interactional and relational
domain (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007)
has profound repercussions for ethics4.
What each of us does in relation to another
is to be structured and characterized,
according to the enactive view, primarily in
inter-individual and interpersonal terms.
It can be said from this perspective that
the ethical character of a given situation
arises, at least in part, from the meanings
3For a discussion of the general influence of indi-
vidualistic views of autonomy on the current social,
cultural and moral imaginary see e.g., Fineman
(2004). Sass (2011) shows that the idea of individual
autonomy—in terms of self-direction and volition—
still plays the role of a widely recognized standard
for assessing mental health. He characterizes it as
an “extremely influential notion” in the field of psy-
chopathology (Sass, 2011, p. 99). Ho (2008) puts for-
ward a criticism of its predominant role in the field of
bioethics, whereas Herring (2014) explores its current
impact in the realm of law, in particular family law.
4It was not the first and only attempt to focus on the
ethical implications of enactivism as such. Varela him-
self has done the pioneering work in his 1999 book
on ethics (Varela, 1999). Recently, DeSouza (2013)
has developed Varela’s idea of the “ethical know-
how” and brought it in connection in an interesting
way with the current debates on the second nature.
Nishigaki (2006) has elaborated the link between
enactivism and ethics from a different perspective.
He attempted to demonstrate an affinity between
the enactive approach and Eastern ethical traditions.
However, none of the above-mentioned authors have
focused on the moral significance of the interactional
and inter-relational domain as described in the enac-
tive account of social life. Their focus has by and large
been to put forward a novel view of the relationship
between emotional and cognitive dimensions ofmoral
sense-making.
that emerge out of the inter-relations
between the participants. These ideas sug-
gest several important shifts in moral
theory. An enactive ethics invites us to
explore “the deep ethical ramifications of
the participatory, collective dynamics of
human inter-relations per se, as opposed
to the ethical significance of individual
actions and their simple aggregations”
(Colombetti and Torrance, 2009, p. 517). It
recommends a de-emphasis of the notions
of individual autonomy and responsibility.
The main lesson to be taken from the pro-
posal of an enactive ethics is, thus, that the
inter-relational, interactional, and inter-
affective dimensions have to gain a central
place in ethics, lest ethical theory overlook
the very subject of its inquiry.
Colombetti and Torrance, however,
have based their proposal of an enac-
tive ethics on De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s
account (2007) and limited the scope
of their inter-relational interpretation of
moral phenomena exclusively to dyadic
and face-to-face interactions. The most
recent developments within the enactive
approach to social life, however, tran-
scend the narrow realm of dyadic inter-
actions and open enactive research to a
wider sphere of interactions with socio-
cultural institutions (Steiner and Stewart,
2009; Froese and Di Paolo, 2011; Torrance
and Froese, 2011). Human “sense-makers”
construct shared meanings in their on-
going interactions within the context of a
vast array of social givens (Torrance and
Froese, 2011, p. 45). The agent’s entrance
into an interactional and properly social
domain requires abiding by a heritage
of pre-established social and cultural
norms, while at the same time expanding
possibilities of the agent’s sense-making
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and agency (Torrance and Froese, 2011).
If we want to take into account the wider
social and institutional dimension of social
life as approached from the enactive per-
spective, the following urgent question
seems inevitable: What would an appro-
priate expansion of an enactive ethics look
like?
The wider normative dimension of
social life plays a central role in a recent
parallel attempt to reinterpret fundamen-
tal ethical concepts against the background
of a different5 embodied and situated
approach to cognition, which can be found
in Cash (2010, 2013). Cash introduces
the “third-wave arguments” for socially
and culturally distributed cognition and
distinguishes them from the individual-
centered focus of the previous arguments
for the extended mind hypothesis, which
are based on Clark and Chalmers’ pio-
neering work (Clark and Chalmers, 1998).
Cash explores the implications of the idea
of socially distributed cognition for sem-
inal moral concepts, such as autonomy,
agency, and responsibility. The main nov-
elty of his answers, on my view, consists in
the recommendation that the advocates of
socially distributed cognition should avoid
reinventing the wheel and avail themselves
of extant arguments elaborated in princi-
pally feminist relational theory and criti-
cism of the individualistic conceptions of
self, agency, and moral autonomy. Cash
refers in particular to the concepts of
relational autonomy and relational self as
introduced in the 1990s by feminist the-
orists and ethicists, such as Meyers (1989,
1997, 1998), Friedman (2000), Mackenzie
and Stoljar (2000), and others, who argue,
in general, that one’s self and one’s auton-
omy are decentralized and are relationally
and socially constituted.
ENACTION AND CARE ETHICS
I argue that the feminist relational the-
ory, to which Cash’s arguments appeal,
and in particular the closely related ethics
of care [as developed by Gilligan (1982),
5It has been repeatedly argued that the extended
mind hypothesis (even the socially extended one) and
enactivism are incompatible for a number of impor-
tant reasons (e.g., Di Paolo, 2009; Thompson and
Stapleton, 2009; Wheeler, 2010; De Jaegher, 2013).
However, there are also a number of commonalities
between the two approaches that allow us to qual-
ify both of them as embodied and situated accounts
of cognition and that justify the next step of our
argumentation.
Noddings (1982); Ruddick (1989), Held
(1993, 2006); Tronto (1993), Kittay (1999),
and many others] can be considered as
a rich source for further developing and
expanding an enactive ethics. Both the
enactive approach and the ethics of care
attempt to rethink the concepts of auton-
omy, individuality and agency in a way
that enables a novel reading of human rela-
tions in terms of the irreducibility of the
inter-relational and interactional domain.
On both approaches, agents are con-
ceived as essentially embodied, situated,
and embedded in multiple relational net-
works at different levels, from the biologi-
cal to the social and the cultural level (e.g.,
Hamington, 2004). Concern and emotion-
ality are central to both perspectives and
are considered as part and parcel of any
agents’ making sense of the world and oth-
ers (e.g., Held, 2006, pp. 21–22). However,
the ethics of care undertook the shift to
the interactive and interpersonal moral
phenomena decades before a proposal of
an enactive ethics had first been made.
I argue that the conceptual and method-
ological toolkit of the ethics of care, its
elaborated accounts of human interdepen-
dency, mutuality, engagement with social
and political institutions, etc., should serve
as a well-suited means of arriving at an
appropriately expanded enactive view of
social and moral phenomena. The expe-
riential knowledge of the ethics of care,
its sensitivity to the inequalities of power-
relations and its developed views of com-
plex structures and relations at various
levels of human social life can provide use-
ful tools for widening an enactive ethics to
the broader domain of properly social life.
On the other hand, the enactive
approach to social phenomena, based
on the concept of participatory sense-
making, provides a detailed description
of the complex relations between persons,
and between persons and institutions,
which can help to account not only for
the specific nature and dynamics of the
social interdependence between persons
(in terms of interactional autonomy),
but also for the generation and subsis-
tence of social institutions. Human social
interactions are essentially situated in
a normative context and are governed
by various social institutions that make
these interactions possible. However,
these norms and institutions “don’t just
exist in a special normative realm inde-
pendently of the actual lives of people:
they are embedded in the ways people
conduct those lives—their continued exis-
tence requires that they be continually
(inter-) enacted, in either word or deed”
(Torrance and Froese, 2011, p. 46). Real
social interactions involve interpretation
and sometimes even creative reinterpreta-
tion and modification of the very norms
that are the framework within which they
take place. The enactive look at “the ori-
gin of and fluid changes in normativity”
(De Jaegher, 2013, p. 22) with the corre-
sponding focus on the bi-directionality
of influence between social interactions
and social institutions, can help us explain
how a criticism and transformation of
social structures, institutions, and norms
can materialize. And this is precisely what
has been at stake in the ethics of care since
soon after its conception (e.g., Held, 1993,
2006; Tronto, 1993, 2013; Sevenhuijsen,
1998; Engster, 2007; Barnes, 2012).
In this connection De Jaegher (2013)
aims to show that we should consider the
enactive approach as a better way of arriv-
ing at a full-blown picture of our inter-
actions with social norms as compared to
the proposal of socially extended and dis-
tributed cognition (as developed by e.g.,
Gallagher and Crisafi, 2009; Gallagher,
2013). On her view, the socially extended
mind approach is limited to addressing
rule-based, hierarchical institutions and
interactions, and unable to grasp fluid and
more participatory aspects of society. She
holds this view, for she sees some aspects
of the socially extended mind approach
as being in line with functionalism of
mainstream cognitive science, which deals
with cognitive agents that are primordially
lone individuals, instrumentally extending
their “cognitive reach.” This is why the
socially extended mind approach, accord-
ing to her reading, tends to be one-
sidedly focused on the functioning of
ready-made, rigid normative systems, and
therefore “would hardly tell us how insti-
tutions could be criticized or changed” (De
Jaegher, 2013, p. 22).
This observation, if correct, indicates
an important reason why the potential
alliance between enactivism and care ethics
may be seen as more promising and fruit-
ful than the alliance between the theory of
socially distributed cognition and feminist
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accounts of relational autonomy. However,
we should proceed with caution and not
overlook the fact that De Jaegher’s crit-
icism is aimed at the funcionalist and
individualist core of the notion of a
socially extended cognition (and only at
Gallagher’s and Crisafi’s account to the
extent that some elements of this view
are still present in it). Most of her points
would obviously not apply to the afore-
mentioned “third-wave arguments” for
socially and culturally distributed cogni-
tion (Cash, 2013). I deem it plausible to
claim that the expansion of an enactive
ethics with the help of care ethics, which
I was arguing for in this paper, and Cash’s
proposal of an alliance between feminist
relational theory and socially distributed
cognition can and should be viewed as
complementary rather than conflicting.
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